




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Assuring Cyber Resilience under NIS2 The CyFun[®] Audit Model and the Role of ISO/IEC 27001

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● Agenda

- CyberFundamentals (CyFun[®]) Conformity Assessment
- NIS2 Authorisation conditions for CABs

CyberFundamentals Conformity Assessment

● CyFun[®] CAS – Part II: Assessment



- How CyFun[®] assessments are performed
- Differences between verification and certification
- What CABs are expected to do
- Why the Clarifications matter


One Assessment Logic, Three Assurance Levels

CyFun[®] assurance levels

- **Basic** → Verification (ISO/IEC 17029)
- **Important** → Verification (ISO/IEC 17029)
- **Essential** → Certification (ISO/IEC 17021-1)

Common principle

- Assessment is always based on a **self-assessment + objective evidence**



● The Central Role of the CyFun[®] Self Assessment

Self-assessment

- Mandatory input for every assessment
- Structured, maturity-based
- Covers documentation **and** implementation maturity

What CABs assess

- Plausibility of maturity scores
- Consistency with evidence
- Conformity with threshold values

● Verification Process (CyFun[®] Basic & Important)

Applies to

- Assurance levels **Basic** and **Important**

Process steps

- Pre-engagement & scope definition
- Planning (full or limited verification)
- Documentary review
- On-site verification of **key measures**
- Verification report
- Independent review
- Verification statement

*Strictly follows
ISO/IEC 17029
+
CyFun[®] specific
requirements*

● Full vs. Limited Verification

Full verification

- First-time verification, scope changes, material maturity changes
- All key measures on site

Limited verification

- Re-confirmation
- At least 50% of key measures
- Permitted only where the scope and maturity are stable

The choice must be motivated and documented by the CAB.



Verifications → assessment of **all** controls

Verification requires a minimum of one day on site and may take longer when necessary.

● Scope description

Pre-engagement (Ref. CyFun CAS A.2.4.1.)

The Conformity Assessment Body shall require the applicant to submit information sufficient to carry out a pre-engagement review (see A.2.1). **The CAB shall make sure that the scope is documented and agreed upon, based on a precise description of the entity to be verified as well as the locations, services/products and processes.**

*The CAB must have reviewed the scope and come to an agreement with the client **before** accepting or refusing to carry out the verification.*

scope: “Legal entity” **≠** OK

● Handling Misstatements (Why Clarifications Exist)

Misstatement

- Claimed maturity not supported by evidence

CAB obligations

- Identify and assess materiality
- Re-score (↓) where needed
- Decide if claim remains valid

 ***Defined in detail in CAS Clarifications***

Important

- The Organisation **cannot correct maturity scores during the same verification** to pass a threshold

Verification statement

Part II A/B 3



[NAME of conformity assessment body], acting as third party conformity assessment body, declares to have verified the following claim:

[NAME, ADDRESS of the organisation and COMPANY NUMBER] declares to satisfy the requirements of the CyberFundamentals assurance level “Basic” on [date] for the following scope: [scope].

[NAME of conformity assessment body] confirms that this claim is materially correct at [date of verification], based on the evaluation of the by [NAME of the organisation] completed self-assessment with version [version of the used self-assessment] on [date of completion of the self-assessment] and supporting objective evidence of the documentation and implementation of the measures required for the CyberFundamentals assurance level “Basic” in the CyberFundamentals Framework version [version of the applicable CyberFundamentals Framework].

Conformance is established against the conditions in the Conformity Assessment Scheme|version [version of the applicable Conformity Assessment Scheme].

This verification statement reflects only the situation at the point in time it is issued.

The framework and the Conformity Assessment Scheme are publicly available on www.cyfun.eu

BELAC 2-405 CyberFundamentals version R1-2026



Verification activities for the CyberFundamentals assurance levels Basic/Important **shall be performed under accreditation**. A verification statement may therefore **be issued only after accreditation has been formally granted for the relevant activity**. No verification statement may be issued prior to the accreditation decision, **even not** without reference to accreditation.

● Certification Process CyFun[®] Essential

Applies to

- Assurance level **Essential**

Certification characteristics

- Management system–oriented
- 3-year cycle
- Initial → Surveillance → Recertification audits

*Here, the focus shifts explicitly from
“controls” to
manageable capabilities.*

Why CyFun[®] CAS Clarifications Are Integral (Not Optional)

CAS Clarifications define

- Required auditor / verifier competence
- How misstatements are handled
- How revised self-assessments are accepted
- Which **management-related controls** apply at AL Essential



Rule

- Clarifications are an **integral part of the CAS**
- CAB staff must be trained on them



Verifications & Audits: assessment of all controls

CyFun[®] Basic & Important (verification)

- Verification is **always based on the complete self-assessment**
- **All included controls are assessed** (no sampling approach)
- Any change in maturity score ⇒ **re-assessment of all affected controls**
- Key measures: always on-site; other controls: appropriate off-site/on-site verification

Key references

CAS Part II – Annex A & B

- ❖ *A.2.2 / B.2.2 Full verification program*
- ❖ *A.2.4.4 / B.2.4.4 Verification execution*

CyFun[®] Essential (audit / certification)

- Initial and recertification audits **shall cover the complete CyberFundamentals set of requirements**
- **Management-related controls are mandatory in every audit** (initial, surveillance, and recertification)

Key references

- ❖ *CAS Annex C – C.2.2.2 Planning*
- ❖ *CAS Clarifications – Topic 3, §1 CAS requirement*

Key takeaway

Under the CyFun[®] CAS there is **no selective assessment of controls**:

- Verifications (Basic/Important) → **all controls in the self-assessment**
- Audits (Essential) → **the full set of controls, including management aspects**

● What This Means for CABs

For CABs already accredited for CyFun®


- Align procedures with Part II + Clarifications
- Ensure **competence** evidence is complete
- Apply consistent judgement across clients
- See points for “prospective” CABs

For prospective CABs

- Accreditation required
- Clear separation from consultancy
- Impartiality
- Annual reporting to the scheme owner



CyFun® CAS is a fully-fledged scheme under accreditation, not a lightweight framework.



Policy for Witnessing & Assessment Programme

Ref: BELAC 2-405 CyberFundamentals R1-2026




General

- The accreditation programme **always includes on-site witnessing** of CAB activities.
- Witnessing is **cluster-based** and covers both **verification (Basic/Important)** and **certification (Essential)** activities.

Initial accreditation

- **At least one witnessing per cluster:**
 - **ISO/IEC 17029 (Basic/Important):** witnessing of a **full verification** (CAS A.2.2 / B.2.2).
 - **ISO/IEC 17021-1 (Essential):** witnessing of **Stage 1 and Stage 2** of the certification audit. → **Stage 1 witnessing shall be conducted on-site.**



Policy for Witnessing & Assessment Programme

Ref: BELAC 2-405 CyberFundamentals R1-2026




During the accreditation cycle

- **Minimum one witness audit per cluster per full accreditation cycle (3 or 5 years),** regardless of whether it concerns:
 - a **verification** (Basic/Important), or
 - a **certification audit** (Essential).
- For shorter accreditation cycles, the assessment programme is **defined case-by-case** by the NAB.

Extension of scope

- **Additional cluster(s): at least one witness audit (≥ 1 day) per added cluster.**
- **Extension to or from Essential \leftrightarrow Basic & Important:**
 - appropriate witnessing (full verification or certification stages 1 & 2),
 - supplemented with technical and/or management-system audits as applicable.



Policy for Witnessing & Assessment Programme

Ref: BELAC 2-405 CyberFundamentals R1-2026



Extension of assurance level (CyFun[®] Basic/Important ⇔ CyFun[®] Essential)

- A CAB already accredited for CyFun[®] Basic/Important applying for accreditation for CyFun[®] Essential must undergo a **full accreditation audit with one witness present**.
- If the assessment is positive, the clusters already included in the scope of accreditation for CyFun[®] Basic/Important may also be included in the scope for CyFun[®] Essential.
- The same applies in the opposite direction.

Witnessing under CyFun[®] is systematic, cluster based and risk covering, with clear minimum requirements for initial accreditation, the accreditation cycle, and scope extensions.

NIS2 Authorisation conditions for CABs

● Authorisation conditions for CABs



Authorisation conditions for Conformity Assessment Bodies (CABs) Version 02 February 2026

- How CABs obtain authorisation
- Which accreditation tracks are recognised
- What authorisation legally entails
- Ongoing obligations once authorised

● Legal Context

Why Authorisation Is Required

- Belgian NIS2 Law (26 April 2024)
- Royal Decree NIS2 (09 June 2024)

Key principle

- Accreditation is necessary, but **not sufficient**.
- Authorisation by the CCB is mandatory.

● Two Step Requirement

Accreditation + Authorisation

1. Accreditation

- By a National Accreditation Body
- Under EU Regulation 765/2008
- Operating under the IAF MLA



2. Authorisation

- Granted by the  CENTRE FOR
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- Based on documented procedures and commitments

● Recognised CAB Categories

Three Authorisation Tracks

- **Part I** – CyberFundamentals (CyFun[®]) accredited CABs
- **Part II** – ISO/IEC 27001 accredited CABs
- **Part III** – CABs accredited to other IT/OT standards

Each track:

- Has **specific authorisation conditions**
- Requires a **formal agreement with the**  CENTRE FOR
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● Common Core Conditions (All Tracks)

Applies to Every CAB

- Valid accreditation certificate
- Branch established in an EU NIS2 country
- That branch included in accreditation scope
- Legally binding agreement with the CCB
- CCB allowed to verify accreditation with the NAB
- Obligation to cooperate with CCB supervision
- Confidential handling of NIS2-related information



● Part I: CyberFundamentals (CyFun[®]) CABs

Authorisation Conditions

CAB must:

- Be accredited against the requirements of **ISO/IEC 17029** (in case of B/I) and the requirements of **ISO/IEC 17021-1** (in case of E), in combination with the requirements of the **CyFun[®] CAS**, including the **Clarifications**
- Use the scheme **without modification**
- Report annually to the CCB:
 - Verification statements
 - Refused claims
 - Complaints & appeals
 - Revised statements

● Mandatory Procedures (CyFun[®] CABs)

What CABs Must Document

- Procedure to ensure **correct scope definition**
- Assessment must cover the **entire organisation**
- Exceptions only when IT/OT environments are:
 - Physically or technically separated
 - Proven not to affect in-scope risks
- Scope demarcation must be explicit and documented

● Part II: ISO/IEC 27001 CABs

Why ISO/IEC 27001 Is Recognised

- ISO/IEC 27001 certification can support NIS2 compliance
- Included as an option in the BE NIS2 legislation

Authorisation Conditions

- **Accreditation** for ISO/IEC 17021-1, in combination with ISO/IEC 27006-1 for ISO/IEC 27001 certification is mandatory
 - **NAB** must operate under EU 765/2008 + IAF MLA + based in a country where the NIS 2 Directive applies.
- The CAB shall have a **branch** established in a country where the NIS 2 Directive applies.
 - The activities of that branch shall be included in the accreditation scope.

● Additional Obligations for ISO/IEC 27001 CABs



Working in a NIS2 context goes beyond Standard Certification

CAB must:

- Upload each NIS2-related certificate + SoA to the CCB database
- Report annually on certificates, refusals, complaints, appeals
- Provide a **scope-definition procedure** (same logic as CyFun®)



See also BELAC 2-405 ISMS R5-2026 Chapter 5 Specific requirements applicable to the conformity assessment body related to the Belgian NIS2 regulation

● SoA Equivalence Requirement (ISO Track)

Critical NIS2 Condition

ISO/IEC 27001 CABs must have a procedure ensuring that:

- The **Statement of Applicability**
- Demonstrates **equivalence** with CyFun[®]:
 - Basic
 - Important
 - Essential
- Assurance level determined via **risk analysis**
- **CyFun[®] Selection Tool is the preferred method**

● Part III: Other IT / OT Standards

Applies to CABs accredited to:

- ISO/IEC 17029 or ISO/IEC 17021-1
- For IT/OT standards other than ISO/IEC 27001

Conditions largely mirror Part II:

- Accreditation + EU presence
- Annual reporting
- Uploading certificates
- Scope and SoA equivalence procedures required

● Supervision & Enforcement

What Happens If Conditions Are Not Met


- Failure to cooperate → warning
- Repeated failures → warning
- Confirmed violations:
 - Formal notice
 - Suspension or revocation of authorisation

● What Authorisation Really Means


Key Take-aways for CABs

- Authorisation is **regulatory trust**
- CABs act within a **national supervisory framework**
- Transparency and cooperation are mandatory
- Scope control and equivalence proof are non-negotiable

***Authorisation is not a formality.
It is the condition that makes CAB activities
legally usable for NIS2 supervision.***



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
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Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium

Under the authority of the Prime Minister

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www.ccb.belgium.be



● What does TLP Green mean?

TRAFFIC LIGHT PROTOCOL (TLP)

Sources may use **TLP:GREEN** when information is useful to increase awareness within their wider community.

Recipients may share **TLP:GREEN** information with peers and partner organizations within their community, but not via publicly accessible channels (e.g. websites, LinkedIn...). **TLP:GREEN** information may not be shared outside of the community. Note: when “community” is not defined, assume the cybersecurity/defense community.

● Green (TLP GREEN)

Limited disclosure, recipients can spread this within their community.